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RISK MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING IN SERVICE
DESIGN
Paul Rohmeyer, paul.rohmeyer@stevens.edu
Tal Ben-Zvi, tal.benzvi@stevens.edu
Stevens Institute of Technology, USA
Abstract
This paper explores the use of risk management techniques to promote the design of resilient services.
Success in achieving any benefit from a new service will be directly affected by the resiliency of the
supporting service architecture including technical and non-technical domains. The concept of
resiliency in services and enterprises is examined. We present a framework to analyze risks and
threats to service resiliency, and offer specific guidance to support the development of resilient
services and service architectures.
The risk assessment framework was created by combining a model of service provider gaps that
represent dimensions of service quality with a risk analysis model. The framework includes
identification of threats and inhibitors to closing service provider gaps. We maintain that risk in
services will remain if service provider gaps are not closed.
Service-based business models and economies will succeed only if we view service resiliency as a
strategic imperative. Effective service design techniques should be adopted, therefore, to include
identification and mapping of the provider gaps and creation of appropriate mitigation strategies.
This is accomplished by application of service blueprinting techniques and subsequent analysis of the
visible risks. The model that we present facilitates the identification of weaknesses or vulnerabilities
in services as well as the impact and likelihood of risk events and enables the planning of remediation
activities at the design stage.
Keywords: Service Management, Service Design, Risk Management, Decision Making.

1

INTRODUCTION

What factors must be addressed to produce high quality, reliable, and robust services and service
architectures? This basic question must be answered because implementation of a service that lacks
resiliency may prove disruptive to the target enterprise or customer base. Designers of services
require methodologies to facilitate the identification of service and process risks in order to promote
design decisions that account for risk characteristics. Organizations not only need to assess risk but to
apply the output of risk analysis as a decision support resource in a variety of contexts. We refer to
these activities as Risk Management Decision Making. This must be done continuously in many
domains. In this paper we explore the application of risk assessment to decisions about the design of
services.
An important characteristic in the deployment of any new system is reliability. We maintain the
value of service systems and architectures is determined therefore by the nature and degree of support
the new service would provide to essential enterprise activities, and the value of such services would
be diminished if the underlying systems and architecture proved unreliable. Therefore there is a need
for resiliency in service design. Stated another way, the promotion of resiliency in the design of a
service will maximize return on investment for the new service by producing reliable offerings that
will meet customer expectations.
In this paper we examine the concept of resiliency from a broad perspective, one that extends
beyond traditional technical viewpoints of redundancy, system backup or disaster recovery. Rather,
resiliency in the fullest sense encompasses the need to design and build reliable systems to support
critical processes and services. The systems must be able to withstand an array of threats and either
deflect or rebound from any risks events that become reality. However, it is not sufficient to address
merely technical threats such as cybersecurity or critical infrastructure risks. Resiliency should be
approached in a more comprehensive way that considers not only the technical but organizational and
process domains, including areas of strategy and culture. Deployment of robust enterprise service
architectures requires an ability to anticipate and understand the full range of risk factors that could
lead to delay or disruption and to the engineering of robust solutions that can successfully face real
challenges. It requires recognition that when new services are designed they must be created with
consideration of a variety of risks otherwise they would ultimately provide little value in supporting
broad enterprise goals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we provide a literature
review to support the explanation of fundamental concepts; then, we present analysis of threats to
service resiliency. This is followed by a presentation and discussion of risk management guidance in
the context of services and our conclusions.

2
2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW
Services and Service Design

Lacy and Macfarlane (2007) described services as “a means of delivering value to customers by
facilitating outcomes customers want to achieve without the ownership of specific costs and risks.
Services facilitate outcomes by enhancing the performance of associated tasks and reducing the costs
of constraints. The result is an increase in the probability of desired outcomes.”
The service industry is viewed by the US government as one of important strategic value.
Carey (2008) stated services accounted for over 80% of total US GDP were increasing as a percentage
of GDP in economies around the globe. The US Department of Commerce website reported in May
2010: “Overall, the United States is the world's premier producer and exporter of services. As the

largest component of the U.S. economy, the services sector includes all economic activity other than
agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. U.S. services exports more than doubled over the past ten
years, rising from $117 billion in 1989 to $246 billion last year. The dominant role that services play
throughout the U.S. economy translates into leadership in technology advancement, growth in skilled
jobs, and global competitiveness. Foreign markets offer incredibly bright prospects for further export
expansion and for creating new jobs by companies exporting U.S. services, and we have barely begun
to tap these markets.” The size and continuing expansion of the service economy is a trend that is sure
to influence business planning in the coming years in profound ways.
Businesses and governments should therefore be concerned with the deployment of robust, high
quality services to ensure the stability of the increasingly interconnected marketplace. The quality of
services with respect to effectiveness in execution and delivery has been explored by Zeithaml and
Bitner (2002) who created a “gaps model of service quality”. The gaps model can be applied to
explore various dimensions of service quality. The model essentially described the “customer gap”
that is the difference between customer expectation and the customer’s perceived realized value.
Closing the customer gap can be accomplished by considering four types of “provider gaps”. Provider
Gap 1 occurs when the provider does not know what the customer expects. Provider Gap 2 is when
we do not select the right service design and standards. Provider Gap 3 is not delivering up to service
standards, and Provider Gap 4 is not matching performance to promises. Each of the provider gaps
represents a degree of failure in service delivery. Provider Gaps 1 and 2 specifically are concerned
with matters of planning and design.

2.2

Enterprise Resiliency

Gaddum (2004) defined resiliency as “The ability of an organization’s business operations to
rapidly adapt and respond to internal or external dynamic changes – opportunities, demands,
disruptions or threats – and continue operations with limited impact to the business.” The author
identified the merits of considering the concept of resiliency from organizational and business, and not
strictly IT, perspectives, and presented a model of six layers of resiliency: strategy, organization,
process, data and applications, technology, and facilities.
McManus (2007) described resilience as a function of an organization’s situation awareness,
management of key vulnerabilities, and its capacity to adapt in a complex, dynamic and interconnected
environment, and described a resilience management process based on those factors. Oldfield (2008)
noted there were numerous types of resilience, including corporate, business, enterprise, emotional,
individual, organizational, sectoral or societal. Oldfield suggested an organization’s resiliency was a
factor of its adaptive capacities, communications, interdependencies, situational awareness, leadership,
enterprise perspective, and culture. Bell (2002) described the Resilient Virtual Organization (RVO)
including domains of leadership, culture, people, systems, and settings.
Organizational rigidity was identified as a possible impediment to resilience in Denhardt
(2009). The author suggested flexible organizations were naturally suited to adjust to developing
threats and therefore might be better in responding to actual risk events as they unfold. Denhardt also
suggested that a degree of excess capacity might be an important and contributing factor to resiliency
as such capacity could be marshaled in a time of crisis. Hiebert (2006) explored resiliency in the
workplace, noting resiliency varied among individuals and includes internal and external (contextual)
drivers.
One important aspect of resiliency is the role of governance. Multi-level governance structures
can provide the capacity to adapt to various changes and enable the organization to manage for
resilience (Armitage 2006). FSF (2008) proposed a multidimensional approach to improving global
financial resiliency in response to the collapse of credit markets. This included increased oversight of
capital, liquidity, and risk management, and enhancements to transparency and responsiveness to risk.
Starr (2003) drew a distinction between enterprise risk management (ERM) and enterprise resiliency,
as the former tends to be emphasis rigidity and system hardening against vulnerabilities and the latter

promotes a more comprehensive, flexible, and ultimately context-driven approach. ERM approaches
often prioritize vulnerability management tactics while resiliency programs emphasize organizational
speed and agility. van Opstal (2007) proposed federal homeland protection efforts should be extended
to include economic resiliency as a national priority, and identified information systems resiliency as a
critical factor in supporting enterprise and, ultimately, economic resiliency.
Services are sometimes provided by integrated “systems of systems” that are designed to
promote the co-creation of value by otherwise distinct entities. The emergence of co-creation
strategies was explored by Ramaswamy (2009).
Ramaswamy explained how increased
interdependency creates shared risks. The operational definition of “enterprise” should therefore be
modified to apply to the extended enterprise of partners, providers, and others who somehow touch the
integrated value chain.

2.3

Competitive Differentiation

Services initially deployed for basic enterprise goals may prove to support new or enhanced
capabilities that may become competitive differentiators. Therefore such services have potential
strategic value. Starr (2003) analyzed a technology company that was able to weather a crisis while a
competitor, affected by the same crisis, could not continue to operate. It is logical that enterprises
seeking to gain access to new customers or markets via new service offerings may establish an
advantage over other emerging competitors who do not have comparatively robust service offerings.
However, investment will simply create potential that can only be realized if the operational service
proves reliable (Madon 2005). Global competition brings with it the threat of replacement by any of a
large number of alternative service providers. Therefore, resiliency would be not only advantageous
but in some cases necessary in order to retain newfound global service arrangements that are based on
continuous execution within negotiated service levels. Technical services may be particularly at risk
of being replaced by a global competitor should resiliency be lacking due to the sometimes low
transitional costs to replace service-oriented technologies.

3

RISK AND THREAT CHARACTERISTICS FOR SERVICES

In this section we explore service risks. We later use these concepts as the basis for our
recommendations in subsequent sections.
Any uncertainty in the deployment or operation of a system can be characterized as risk. Risk
can be decomposed into basic elements of threat, vulnerability, impact, and likelihood of occurrence.
Risk can also be considered from technical and project perspectives. Today risk is generally
increasing due to the challenges of globalization, technological complexity, increased technical and
process interdependencies, and other factors (FSF 2008), (van Opstal 2007), (Rohmeyer and Stohr
2004).
All technologies present inherent technical risks. Such risks are the result of flaws, poor quality,
misconfiguration, and/or incompatibilities that result in dysfunction. New service initiatives are
presented with project risks that threaten to diminish the value of the service design investment.
Project risks include any factors that impede successful deployment. Pade (2006) explained project
outcomes may be characterized as total failures, partial failures, or successes, with respect to
attainment of major goals. The author claimed that further consideration must be given to
sustainability or the capability the system to continue operating at full or partial success in order to
provide an enduring benefit (i.e. resilience).
We define a threat as any factor that challenges any state of resiliency. In establishing a threat
framework for services we first need to identify all pre and post conditions that represent potential
disruptors to the project and, ultimately, the completed service. Any disruptor to people, process, and
technology in the context of service deployment or operation should be considered. However, the

variety of service types and deployment environments suggests splitting of the threat analysis into
examination of general and application-specific risks, respectively.
We also need to consider threats of varying impact. In technical planning there is sometimes a
tendency to consider catastrophic but largely theoretical threats at the expense of threats that although
less novel and impactful are more probable. Common threats to the organizational value chain,
incidents that sometimes would not be reported outside of the organization, are nonetheless damaging
the ability to deliver services. van Opstal (2007) similarly noted the evaluation of threats to resiliency
should not be limited to catastrophic incidents. In our framework we view threats in categories of
financial, technical, deployment, environment, and process, which are visible across general domains
of people, processes, and technologies.
Financial threats include a failure to obtain, or retain, adequate funding to support the
deployment initiative or the continuous operation of the service. Service deployments can span
months and years and therefore may not sustain the shifting sands of organizational politics or
turbulence in the greater economy, both of which threaten continued funding. Providers of resources
and skills are also subject to the same forces and may therefore be forced from business during a
complex deployment.
The remaining category is threats to process. Enterprises may have a general grasp of
fundamental risk and threat dimensions. However not as clear is the recognition of the threat of
increased reliance on the new system, which increases the impact dimension of a risk event. Processes
that were largely unautomated before, for example, become highly dependent on the underlying
information systems. Therefore a system disruption can quickly become a process, service, and
perhaps enterprise disruption.

4

A FRAMEWORK TO MANAGE RISKS IN SERVICES AT THE
DESIGN STAGE

In this section we explore and synthesize the literature into our risk and threat framework.
Our framework supports evaluation of dimensions of service, enterprise, and technical resiliency, and
emphasizes the importance of culture, planning, enterprise risk management, alignment, design, and
governance in moving towards building service resiliency that is characterized by a minimized
provider gap. Management of both the implementation and the operational risks is therefore essential
to the success of service design initiatives. The following is a summary of the major themes and
explanation of applicability to our framework.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the user of the service, the customer, only interacts with the service
provider enterprise via service interactions. The service design acts as an abstraction layer, blocking
the underlying organizational attributes from view. Thus the customer only assesses service quality on
the basis of the provider gap. The service is moved closer to the customer’s expectations (provider
gap is reduced) by the support of adequately designed service architecture. The service architecture,
as well as the service, are first designed to minimize the provider gap and subsequently subjected to
continuous enterprise risk management. Therefore risk management is important in both the service
design and the operational phases of deployment.

Figure 1.

4.1

Conceptual Model of Risk Management in Service Design

Services Architecture: Creating a Culture of Resiliency

It is vital to build a culture of resiliency to support service design and operations. The success
of any implementation will be limited if the new system is not reliable. Weeks (2009) explained the
importance of building a culture of resiliency awareness, and offered guidance on how to do so in
Weeks and Benade (2009). McManus (2007) identified similar requirements. McManus (2007)
described a resilience management process that included identifying the need to build awareness of
resilience issues, selecting organization-critical components, completion of a self-assessment of
vulnerabilities, identification of key vulnerabilities, and what was characterized as increasing adaptive
capacity, represented by a continuum that sought to move the organization away from functional silos
to mature and integrated leadership, management, and governance structures. A high level mapping of
strategic concerns was also provided in Pade (2006) that identified domains of sustainability in
development initiatives as socio-cultural, institutional, economic, political, and technological. Heeks
(2003) examined design-related failures in e-Government, while Wade (2002) identified the
challenges of building and supporting multi-layer solutions that present inherent compatibility and
management challenges.
Cultural challenges were similarly explored in Dalberg (2006) that observed cross-cultural
initiatives are faced with unique challenges and provided guidance on requirements and design
activities to overcome cultural barriers. Xu (2008) stressed the need to employ case studies in the
planning process in order to learn about historical disruptions and suggesting using the generalized
risk elements of the respective cases to motivate the organization to recognize the need for resilience.
Kefallinos, Lambrou and Sykas (2009) presented an extended risk assessment model for secure
e-government projects. The model incorporated fundamental risk dimensions of impact, probability,
critical success factors, countermeasures, costs, and residual risk which the authors characterized as
“coverage”. The model suggests the fundamental risk dimensions should be evaluated at various
“levels” including political, regulatory, financial, procurement, and interoperability.

4.2

Services Architecture: Enterprise Resiliency

An important goal in deploying new services is the creation of robust capabilities to support and
promote a resilient enterprise. SEI Resiliency Management Model (2008) (RMM) and SEI Resiliency
Engineering Framework (2008) (REF) provide substantial guidance on enterprise resiliency. RMM

was architected to promote continuity in service delivery. RMM defines service continuity to include
technical and process domains and recommends organizations develop plans to achieve resiliency
based on their unique risk environment and other factors. RMM recommends organizations identify
high-value services, assess the risks to those services, and calculate the consequences of risk events.
REF is closely related to the CMM-I (SEI Capability Maturity Model for Integration) and promotes an
enterprise perspective in the engineering of resilient information systems, including domains of
enterprise management, engineering, operations, and process management. Enterprise resiliency
therefore combines technical and non-technical domains.

4.3

Services Architecture: Technical Resiliency

Achieving technical resiliency is required to enable success in new service enterprises.
Radhakrishnan (2008) presented a model of key performance indicators for IT Service management.
Radhakrishnan identified the concept of “high availability service management”(HASM) to prioritize
resiliency within the IT service management domain through the use of Six Sigma and other quality
methods. HASM emphasizes system event and incident management as well as high quality
infrastructure, architecture and design towards the objective of building sustainable systems. Writing
on the Resilient Economy, van Opstal (2007) examined the challenge of balancing competitiveness
and security, and identified the need to adopt a resilience perspective that promotes agility and
adaptability instead of static or compliance-driven security.
Similarly, the Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) was created by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) with the support of various government and non-governmental
groups, with focus on improving cybersecurity in the following domains (ITU 2008): Legal Measures,
Technical and Procedural Measures, Organizational Structures, Capacity Building, and International
Cooperation. van Opstal (2007) and ITU (2008) both suggest improvements are needed to traditional
technical protection models to support the new interdependent global services paradigm and presented
strategic technical guidance. US Senate (2009) introduced bill S.773 Cybersecurity Act of 2009,
described as “a bill to ensure the continued free flow of commerce within the United States and with
its global trading partners through secure cyber communications, to provide for the continued
development and exploitation of the Internet and intranet communications for such purposes.”

4.4

Service Planning and Design

New service design efforts should be guided by formalized planning that takes proactive and
reactive viewpoints with respect to risk management. Resiliency should be built into the enterprise
design. Effective services should not simply follow the traditional definition of resilience (i.e. ability
to rebound or bounce back from an incident) but to block the effects of incidents as well (i.e. repel).
Weeks (2009) explained the importance of including both proactive and reactive postures in the
resiliency model. Resilience in the broad sense suggests an ability to withstand events, system attacks,
physical disruption, and other possible incidents. Organizations should adopt a comprehensive scope
of planning. Pade (2006) identified domains of sustainability in development initiatives as sociocultural, institutional, economic, political, and technological, and planning activities should take a
similarly broad perspective. There is a substantial literature on risk assessment and technical planning
to support operational and business continuity, which was summarized in Rohmeyer, Stohr (2004).
It is imperative that design teams promote concepts of robustness, stability, and highavailability at the earliest design stages. Technical, process, and information interdependencies should
be considered. The organization that will rely on the operational service should similarly be designed
for resiliency, incorporating themes of awareness building and organizational redundancy as suggested
by the literature. Development projects should include specific programs to protect revenuegenerating processes through technical, process resiliency and organizational resiliency. Osterwalder
(2004) similarly examined small and medium sized businesses in developing countries and presented

business model guidance for information systems based business models with the intent of integrating
with the supply chains of developed nations.
Carey (2008) described the technique of “service blueprinting” that may be useful in the service
planning and design stages. Carey identified five components to be considered when analyzing the
provider-customer interaction. “Customer actions include all of the steps customers take when using a
particular service as part of the service delivery process. Onstage/visible contact employee actions are
the actions of frontline contact employees that occur as part of a face-to-face encounter with
customers. Backstage/visible contact employee actions are non-visible interactions with customers,
such as telephone calls, as well as other activities employees undertake in order to prepare to serve
customers or that are part of their role responsibilities. Support processes are all activities carried out
by individuals in a company who are not contact employees, but whose functions are crucial to the
carrying out of services processes. Physical evidence represents all of the tangibles that customers are
exposed or collect to during their contact with a company.” The structure for blueprinting described
by Carey can provide the analysis framework a detailed evaluation of services in support of risk
management activities.

4.5

Continuous Enterprise Risk Management

There is a need to continuously evaluate the unique risk elements of each organization and
service initiative. An effective enterprise risk management (ERM) process would therefore be
beneficial. Starr (2003) and McManus (2007) offered guidance on evaluating the organization as part
of designing an ERM structure. Such an evaluation can be used to identify the unique risk elements.
Starr (2003) presented steps to achieve resiliency as assessment of enterprise risk, use of the risk
assessment as feedback to strategy and operations, and development of an organizational structure that
uses available information to monitor risk and can respond as risk factors change. McManus (2007)
also echoed the need to improve situational awareness so the organization can build a capacity to adapt
to risk as challenges or risk dimensions change. All levels of risk should be considered within the
model, from minimally disruptive through existential threats.
The key input to the ERM process is a detailed service description. Blueprinting as described
by Carey (2008), and explained earlier in this document, should be performed first to establish an
understanding of the service flow as well as identification the systems and information components the
service is based on.
An output of the ERM process should be a resiliency management program (RMP). The RMP
should include a controls architecture that presents a control point for each enumerated risk. The RMP
should attempt to identify all threats to resiliency. Each threat should be analyzed in regards to the
respective vulnerabilities, the impact of the risk event, and likelihood of occurrence. Once these risk
factors are considered, an appropriate mitigation strategy (i.e. control) should be designed for each
threat. A method for monitoring and testing each control should be established as well as a schedule
for period testing. It is important to align the RMP with the strategic objectives and strategy of the
initiative and, perhaps, the development sponsor. The outcomes of the development effort should be
important drivers in the RMP development process.
Governance considerations vary across the implementation lifecycle. The organizations and
individuals involved in planning, design, and deployment in many cases will often not be involved in
the ongoing operations. Therefore it is import to identify governance structures that will oversee
funding, internal controls, and reporting from pre and post perspectives. Operational services should
include structures to include accountability to maintain the Resiliency Management Program. The
responsibility of local managers and technicians must extend beyond basic service provisioning and
emphasize the importance of delivering high quality, reliable, and dependable service. Madon (2005)
examined governance challenges in the deployment of call centers and explored aspects of call center
sustainability.

4.6

Risk Analysis Framework

As described the provider gap model characterizes various types and degrees of service failure
and is therefore a sound base to build the risk assessment on. A general framework for evaluating
service risks is presented in Table 1.
Outcome
The desired
value/benefits
of the service.

Table 1.

Threat
Potential
disruptor or
inhibitor.

Vulnerability
A weakness in
any part of the
service system
or valuechain.

Impact
The outcome
of an actual
disruption.

Likelihood
The
probability of
occurrence

Mitigation
Steps taken to
reduce the
impact of the
disruption (i.e.
a control)

Monitoring
Continuous
validation of
the
operational
effectiveness
of the control.

General Risk Management Framework

The risk evaluation for a particular service should similarly entail listing all desired outcomes
of the development exercise accompanied by the analysis of corresponding risk to each objective as
shown in Table 1. Ideally, this process should be initiated during the design stage of the initiative so
feedback on significant risks can be considered by designers and architectures to help minimize
inherent risk characteristics.
As explained previously, however, service risks are somewhat unique and therefore
application of the gaps model would improve the analysis of service-related risks. A basic adaptation
of the gaps model to the risk context is therefore presented in Table 2.
Provider Gap General
Threat(s)
1 – Not
Insufficient
knowing what data and/or
customers
analysis.
expect
2 – Not
selecting the
right service
designs and
standards

Ineffective
decision
making.

3 - Not
delivering to
service
standards

Operational
failures,
personnel
challenges,
poor
forecasting
of supply
and demand.
Failure to
manage
customer
expectations.

4- Not
matching
performance
to promises

Vulnerability

Impact

Likelihood

Poor market
research or
customer
relationship
management.
Poor design,
Lack of
customeraccepted
standards.

Creation of
services that
customers do
not want.

Dependent on
degree of
innovation in
the service.

Service design
weaknesses,
Inability to
monitor
partners,
inadequate
governance.
Poor
communication,
Inadequate
investment in
customer
relationship.

Mitigation

Monitoring

Use of
multiple
approaches to
assessing
demand.
Understanding Dependent on Improve
demand but
degree of
decision
creating
effectiveness support and
services that in decision
decision
do not address making.
making
it.
processes.
Understand
Dependent on Vetting of
demand,
the ability of employees and
design the
service
partners.
right service, providers to
Testing of
but do not
execute.
architectures.
execute in
operations.

Know your
customer.

Customer
interests,
desires,
requirements
go unmet.

Continuous
evaluation of
customer
relationship
personnel.

Dependent on
effectiveness
of the
customer
relationship
management
process.

Investment in
customer
relationship
management.

Evaluate
decisions via
post
implementatio
n techniques.
Monitoring
programs for
architectures,
vendors, and
personnel.

Table 2.

Service Risk Analysis Framework Using the Gaps Model

Table 2 illustrates that risk management in the services context can be facilitated by devising tactics
and strategies to overcome or avoid the inhibitors to closing the provider gaps.

5

CONCLUSIONS AND POTENTIAL FUTURE RESEARCH

Resilient services are essential in building and sustaining resilient enterprises. The promotion of
a culture of resiliency is therefore an urgent requirement. This paper presented a generalized model
for a Risk Management Program for service design that may contribute to project and operational
success by establishing a resiliency goal and illustrating the genuine risks to system owners and
operators. While an exhaustive risk analysis and mitigation program may not be feasible in some
cases, even partial implementation of a risk-oriented framework should be expected to provide
benefits via improved service resiliency.
As described in the paper we recommend the design of new services should include the use of (a)
service blueprinting techniques to specify service characteristics in detail, and (b) service risk analysis
techniques based on the provider gap model. This paper was an initial step to adapt the goal of
enterprise resiliency to the services context. We established a basis of relevant risk management
guidance and identified barriers to success in broad terms.
A next step in our research will be testing the model by completing risk assessments of a sample
of implemented services. The assessments will seek to identify unmitigated risks and, if possible,
isolate risks that could have been identified in the service design stage. A potential benefit of using
the model is the early detection of service risks and therefore avoidance of a provider gap.
Future research in this area is also needed to provide additional techniques to improve service
quality in order to support the enumeration and analysis of risks in systems characterized by heavy
reliance on models of co-created value to promote the design of more resilient integrated services and
service architectures.
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